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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-WAIVER OF
TRIAL BY JURY IN FELONY CASES.-

[Illinois] The principal case arose
on an original petition in the name
of the people of the State of Illinois, on the relation of John A.
Swanson, state's attorney of Cook
County, for a writ of mandamus
against Harry M, Fisher, judge of
the circuit court of Cook County
and ex officio judge of the criminal
court of the same county. The petition alleged that an indictment was
returned in the criminal court of
Cook County charging one Albert
Weinberg with the crime of rape;
that on arraignment he pleaded not
guilty and waived a jury trial, and
submitted the case to the court; that
the respondent heard the testimony
of witnesses, found the defendant
not guilty, and rendered judgment
in accordance with that finding.
The prayer of the petition was for
a writ of mandamus commanding
the respondent to expunge from the
records of the criminal court all the
proceedings resulting in Weinberg's
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discharge on the ground that on the
particular indictment the respondent
had neither authority to peimit the
waiver of the jury trial, nor jurisdiction to hear and determine the
cause on such waiver, with the result that all the proceedings complained of were void. Writ denied.
Held: Trial by jury is a right which
may be waived by the defendant in
a felony case, upon a plea of not
guilty, provided he waives the right
expressly and intelligently and receives the sanction of the court, and
the court, upon such waiver, may
then proceed, without the intervention of a jury, to hear and determine the case and pronounce
judgment: People v. Fisher (Illinois 1930) 172 N. E. 722.
This holding is a complete reversal of the Illinois law on this
point. Prior to the principal case
the Supreme Court had held repeatedly that there could be no waiver
of a jury trial in felony cases in
which the defendant had pleaded
not guilty: Harrisv. People (1889)
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128 Ill. 585, 21 N. E. 563; Morgan
v. People (1891) 136 Ill. 161, 26 N.
E. 651. However, in the princpal
case, Harris v. People, supra, and
Morgan v. People, supra, were specifically overruled. The reasoning
in the principal case follows closely
that which was used in a late case
similarly decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States: Patton
v. United States (1930) 281 U. S.
276, 50 S. Ct. R. 253, 74 L. ed. 854.
That case likewise was a reversal
of previous Federal holdings. There
is a distinction to be noticed between the principal case and Patton
v. United States, supra, however.
The Patton case required an express
and intelligent waiver by the accused, but it was not to be effective
unless the consent of the court and
of government counsel were obtained. The principal case does not
require the sanction of the state's
attorney.
This seemingly unimportant difference assumes increased
importance when it is. realized that
one of the strongest arguments in
favor of the allowance of such a
waiver in felony cases is that it is
to the advantage of the defendant
in many cases, that he be allowed to
waive a jury trial, e. g., where there
is a strong public sentiment against
the defendant either because of his
race, color, religion, or the heinousness of the crime that was committed. Consent of the state's attorney
might be very difficult, if not impossible to obtain under such circumstances.
The question of trial without jury
at the option of the defendant has
resulted in two lines of holdings in
the various state jurisdictions. It
rests, in the ultimate analysis, on
whether the particular state constitution, either expressly, or impliedly, by interpretation, allows such a
waiver. Where there is an express
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provision made for a waiver in the
constitution there is no great question raised, as 'in the following
states: Arkansas, Const., 1874, Art.
II, sec. 7; California, Const., 1879,
Art. I, sec. 7, Amendment of Nov.
6, 1928; Maryland, Const., 1867,
Art. IV, sec. 8, Code, 1924, Art.
75, sec. 109; Minnesota, Const.,
1857, Art. I, sec. 4; North Carolina,
Const., 1876, Art. IV, sec. 13; Oklahoma, Const., 1907, Art. IV, sec. 20;
Wisconsin, Const., 1848, Art. I sec.
5. Several of these state constitutions read "in all eases in the manner prescribed by law" and in these
the statutes have generally limited
the waiver to misdemeanors; Arkansas, Dig. of Statutes, 1921, sec..
3086; California, Pen. Code, 1925,
sec. 1042; Minnesota, no statute
found. Also certain states allow
by statute waiver in all cases either
with or without express permission in the- constitution: Connecticut, Pub. Acts, 1927, ch. 107
(Amendment to sec. 6641 of Gen.
Statutes, 1918) ; Indiana, Burns
Stat., 1926, sec. 2299; Maryland,
Code, 1924, Art. 75; sec. 109; Michigan, Pub. Acts, 1927, No. 175, ch.
III, sec. 3, and ch. VIII, sec. 8;
Wisconsin, Sess. Laws, 1925, ch.
124, p. 186; Washington (in all but
capital cases), Rem. Comp. Stat.,
1922, see. 2144.
Where there are no express provisions the interpretations vary with
the wording of the constitution,
because of the conflicting views as
to whether trial by jury is a formal
part of the governmental machinery,
whether it is against public policy
to allow a waiver, or whether trial
by jury is such a fundamental right
that it cannot be waived. As an
illustration, some constitutions contain the clause "the accused shall
have the right to a trial by jury";
Illinois, Const., 1870, Art. II, sec. 5.
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One view, as illustrated by the principal case, has been to construe this
"right to a trial by jury" as a personal privilege which may be waived
by the defendant. Those jurisdictions which adopt this view, usually
have construed the more mandatory
type of provision, "trial of all crimes
shall be by jury," which generally
accompanies the former, to be
merely directory as is illustrated by
Patton v. United States, supra. But
other jurisdictions have construed
this right, as at common law, to be
so vital to the public interest as to
prevent a waiver by the accused:
Cancenni v. People (1858) 18 N. Y.
128; People ex ret Battista v. Christian (1928) 249 N. Y. 314; Hilt v.
People (1868) 16 Mich. 351; State
v. Lockwood (1877) 43 Wis. 403.
(The last two cases are not the law
of Michigan and Wisconsin today,
but are illustrative of the views
which those jurisdictions once had
on this subject.) Howev'er, other
decisions have been made, more
satisfactorily reasoned, it is believed, which have considered this
objection and have concluded even
though this may have been true at
common law the reasons for it no
longer exist. At that time the criminal law was so strict and harsh
that such protective guarantees as
trial by jury, the inability to waive
it, etc., were fundamentally necessary to provide a fair trial for the accused. The conditions existent during that period, which made the rule
necessary, have been eliminated,
hence the rule need not be retained:
Patton v. United States, supra;
Hack v. State (1910) 141 Wis. 346,
124 N. W. 492:
(Illustrates a
further development of Wisconsin
law on this subject). Another argument against the doctrine expressed
in Cancend v. People, supra, is that
since the accused may plead guilty,

which impliedly waives a jury trial
and allows the court to pass 'judgment, there is no good reason why
a plea of not guilty and an express
waiver of a jury trial should not be
allowed: State v. Kaufman (1879)
51 Iowa 578, 2 N. W. 275. A further
argument against the allowance of a
waiver of jury trial is that a jury
is part of the formal governmental
machinery and the trial of a felony
case without a jury leaves the court
without jurisdiction
because a
fundamental part of the trial has
been omitted: State v. Ellis (1900)
22 Wash. 129, 60 Pac. 136; State v.
Mansfield (1867)
41 Mo. 471;
Michaelson v. Beenter (1904) 72
Neb. 761, 101 N. W. 1007; In re"
McQuown (1907) 19 Okla. 347;
Warwick v. State (1886) 47 Ark.
568, 2 S. W. 335. This argument is
rebutted by the fact that on a plea
of guilty, the court alone may pronounce judgment, and thus, if a
jury is an integral part of the governmental machinery it is difficult
to see how any judgment so given
can be upheld: State v. Kaufman,
supra; Patton v. United States,
supra. Furthermore, the recognition of the defendant's right to
waive trial by jury in misdemeanor
cases is one of the most commoilly
accepted doctrines in the criminal
procedure of all the State and Federal courts today. The absence of -a
jury should leave the court without
jurisdiction here as well, if the
reasoning mentioned is followed
to its logical conclusion.
It is believed that the holding in
the principal case is a sound one,
for many reasons. One writer, after
an analysis of the various types of
state constitutions, has come to the
conclusion that most of the prevailing constitutional provisions pertaining to the jury are subject to
the interpretation that trial by jury
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is a privilege which the accused has
the power to surrender at his option
in all criminal cases: Oppenheim,
"Waiver of Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases" (1927) 25 Michigan
Las', Rev. 695. The construction
that it is a privilege ?iepresents the
tendency in the decisions: Ibid.
The reason behind the rule of the
common law that such a waiver is
against the public interest began to
disappear when. Sir Samuel Romilly began his reforms which made
the criminal law less harsh and
rigid. Construing the right to a
trial by jury as a privilege which
may be waived does not decrease
the rights of an accused, but, on the
contrary, increases them. Under the
holding in the principal case an accused cannot be forced to accept a
jury trial in a community where the
public is prejudiced against him,
thus avoiding a serious risk of con-.'iction from a jury, which is more
apt to be swayed by prejudice than
is a judge. The following statistics
(taken from Bundick, "Trial Without Jury" (1930) 36 Case and Comment 26) were issued by the state's
attorney of Baltimore City, which
has allowed waiver of trial by jury
for many years:
. Cases Handled
"Years
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929

Jury Trial
180
205
271
229
115
237

Directly
by Court
4,326
4,347
3,774
4,588
4,531
4,374."

This shows that the great majority
of accused persons prefer to be
tried by the presiding judge instead
of by a jury. And not only does the
allowance of a waiver of jury trial
aid accused persons, but it facilitates

the handling of criminal cases generally, which are slow at best, by
eliminating the slow, tedious process
of selecting a jury, and by eliminating technicalities in the admission
of evidence.
ORRIN C. KNUDSEN.

RAPE-MENTAL CAPACITY TO CON-

Defendant was
charged with the rape of a woman
twenty-two years old, the information alleging that the prosecutrix
was "incapable of giving legal consent to said act of sexual intercourse by reason of her being of
unsound mind." An appeal was
taken from a conviction and an order denying a new trial, defendant
urging that the evidence was insufficient to show that the prosecutrix
was incapable of giving legal consent. The mother of the prosecutrix
was insane and had been committed
to a state hospital. All of the witnesses agreed that the prosecutrix
was of subnormal mentality. However, she had kept house for her
father and brother for several years,
and at the time of the acts in question was attending high school,
though making slow progress. The
Court in reviewing the evidence
concluded that the prosecutrix
seemed to know what constituted
the physical act and that pregnancy
might result therefrom, but that she
apparently had little conception of
other serious consequences which
would follow. The reason prosecutrix gave for submitting to the
act was that "If I didn't let him do
it he would just stand there all day
and not let me get anything done
for I was busy-." Held on appeal,
that the evidence was not insufficient to show that the prosecutrix
was incapable of giving legal conSENT.-[California]

CRIMINAL CASES

sent: People v. Boggs (Cal. 1930)
290 P. 618.
In the words of the court,
"Whether the' woman possessed
mental capacity sufficient to give
legal consent must, saving in exceptional cases, remain a question
of fact for the jury. It need but be
said that legal consent presupposes
an intelligence capable of understanding the act, its nature, and possible consequence. The understanding referred to must, of course, be
an intelligent understanding and the
consequences include more than the
mere physical consequences."
In this discussion, only the consent element in rape will be considered. A woman may be so mentally deficient as to be incapable of
giving what is called "legal consent"
to the act of intercourse even though
she give actual consent. We are
here concerned chiefly with the extent of the unsoundness of mind on
the part of the woman necessary to
render her "legally" incapable of
consenting to the act, and the tests
given the jury to aid them in determining the capacity to consent.
In the first place, the question ot
capacity to consent is one for the
jury to decide with the aid of instructions from the Court. The
judge can offer no mechanical measuring device, no practical standard
of the necessary mental capacity to
consent; actually the judge offers
little help other than through instructions framed with phrases so
general as to be almost of no assistance. In general, a woman is
said to be capable of legal consent
when she is capable of "understanding and appreciating the act committed, its immoral character, and
the probable or natural consequences
which may attend it": Note L. R.
A. 1916 F742, 744.
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A woman with less intellect than
is required to make a contract may
so consent to a carnal connection
that it will not be rape: Bishop
"Criminal Law" (9th ed. 1923) sec.
1121-1; and the mere fact that a
woman is weak-minded does not disable or debar her from consenting
to the act: McQuirk v. State (1887)
84 Ala. 435, 4 So. 775. Even though
of unsound mind, if the woman
yields to the act from animal passion, many courts hold that the act
is not against the will or without
consent: State v. Tarr (1869) 28
Iowa 397; Ann. Cas. 1912 B 1049.
This raises the question whether
ignorance on the part of the defendant of the mental deficiency of the
woman is an excuse. In People v.
Griffin (1897) 117 Cal. 583, 49 P.
711, it was held that such ignorance
is no defense, but the weight of
authority seems otherwise: Missouri v. Helderle (Mo. 1916) 186
S. W. 696; Ress v. Shepherd (1909)
84 Neb. 268, 120 N. W. 1132;
Beaven v. Comnwnwealth (1895)
17 Ky. L. Rep. 246, 30 S. W. 968;
Wharton "Criminal Law" (11 ed.
1912) sec. 703; Brilt "Cyclopedia
Criminal Law" (1923) sec. 889. In
some states, as in Minnesota, where
the statute declares that it is rape to
have intercourse with a female incapable, through unsoundness of
mind, of giving consent, the question of knowledge on the part of the
defendant of such mental condition
is held to be dispensed with by the
statute: State v. Dombroski (1920)
145 Minn. 278, 176 N. W. 985.
A review of the cases involving
mental capacity to consent would
disclose no workable standard to aid
in the decision of other cases. But
in no one of the cases in which the
woman was found incapable of consent do we find an intellect so near
normal as in the instant case. Gen-
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erally, the women concerned were
idiots or imbeciles incapable of coherent speech, unable to care for
themselves or to understand or respond to questions.
The following are typical of the
tests of mental capacity generally
applied by the courts. "The test of
mental capacity of a woman to consent to sexual intercourse . .
is
whether she was capable or incapable of exercising judgment in the
matter": Wharton and Stile "Medical Jurisprudence" (5th -ed. 1905)
sec. 203; Clevenger "Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity" (1893) vol.
10, 201; Reg. v. Barratt (1873) 12
Cox C. C. 498. "This mental incapacity must reach the point where
the woman is incapable of expressing any intelligent assent or dissent": Morrow v. State (1913) 13
Ga. App. 189. Another test is the
incapability of 'understanding the
moral nature of the act, or of giving assent thereto": State v. Warren (1910) 232 Mo. 185, 200, 134
S. W. 522. "Though you find her
of weak mind, yet if she was capable of exercising her will sufficiently to control her personal actions, and if she acquiesced in the
connection, the defendant would not
be guilty": State v. Tarr, supra.
"All females who, by reason of mental unsoundness, are so far deprived
of the power to form or entertain
an intelligent opinion on the subject, of realizing the nature and
moral wrong of the act, and the
possible consequences thereof to
them": State v. Dombroski, supra.
"Those who, by reason of mental
inferiority are incapable of knowing or realizing the moral quality of
the act, and are therefore also incapable of giving rational consent"
is a test applied to a statute in respect to females "of imbecility of
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mind": State v. Haner (1919) 186
Iowa 1259, 1262, 173 N. W. 225. In
Lee v. State (1901) 43 Texas Cr.
285, 286, 64 S. W. 1047, where the
words in the statute were: "a woman
being so mentally diseased at the
time as to have no will to oppose
the act," the test given was: "the
intellect must be so broken down or
destroyed by disease as not to know
the right or wrong of the particular
act, or knowing the right and
wrong thereof, on account of mental
disease not able to oppose the will
to the act of carnal intercourse."
The determination of the existence or non-existence of mental
capacity to consent to intercourse is
a difficult one: Puttkammer "Consent in Rape" .(1925) 19 Ill. Law
Rev. 410. For that reason it seems
unjust to criticize a court for refusing to disturb the verdict of a
jury on that question, but it is submitted that in the instant case of
People v. Boggs, the court affirmed
a conviction for the rape of a woman who in most of the courts in the
United States .and England would
have been found to be mentally capable of legal consent. We have a
woman who, though of subnormal
intelligence, was attending high
school and was taking care of a
house, a woman who knew the nature of the act and that pregnancy
might result therefrom. Here, by
reason of having "little conception
of other serious consequences which
would follow," the woman was held
mentally incapable of consent, with
the result that the defendant, though
having actual consent, was held
guilty of rape, one of the most serious offenses known to the law, and
one carrying with it a punishment
correspondingly severe.
ABRAHAM FISHMAN.
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FORGERYCRIMINAL LAWDORSING A CHECK UNDER AN
NAME FOR PURPOSES
SUMED

IN-

AsOF

FRAuDM-[Illinois] The defendant,
a margin clerk in the main office
of a brokerage firm, opened an account in a branch office of that company under the name of a personal
friend, H. L. Oppenheimer, who
neither knew of nor authorized such
Although; by the
a transaction.
brokerage company's rules, no accounts were to be taken under false
names and without proper marginal
deposits, various buying and selling
orders in the account were placed
by the defendant and subsequently
approved by him as margin clerk
with no collateral deposited to cover
the margins. By such manipulations the Oppenheimer account had
been built up to a balance of about
$1,850, when the defendant caused
the cashier to issue to him a company check for that account payable to Oppenheimer. The check
was then indorsed "Oppenheimer"'
by the defendant and the money appropriated by him. On an idictment for forging the indorsement
and uttering the check, the defendant was convicted of forgery. Held,
on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed, the facts of the offense
charged sufficiently stating a case
of forgery: People v. Dwyer (Ill.
1930) 173 N. E. 765.
The principal defense contention,
as argued upon appeal, was that the
foregoing facts did not establish a
case of forgery, and that the offense
was rather that of obtaining money
under false pretences. The statutory
definition of forgery is: "Every
person who shall falsely make, alter,
forge, or counterfeit any .
check, draft, bill of exchange
. .
or shall utter, publish, pass, or attempt to pass as true and genuine
. . . knowing the same to be false,

altered, forged, or counterfeited with
intent to prejudice, damage, or defraud any person, body politic or
corporate . . . shall be deemed
guilty of forgery . . "

Ill. Rev.

Stat. (Smith Hurd 1929) ch. 38,
sec. 277. Under this statute, three
essential elements must be present
to constitute a forgery, namely, (a)
a false writing or alteration of an
instrument, (b) the instrument as
made must be apparently capable of
defrauding and (c) there must be
an intent to d 'fraud: Goodman "v.
People (1907) 228 Ili. 154, 81 N.
E. 830. That the instrument is apparently capable of defrauding implies that it contains "an absolute,
unconditional promise or obligation
to pay a sum of money or personal
property": Shirk v. People (1887)
121 Ill. 61, 11 N. E. 888, or again,
that it has apparent legal efficacy:
White v. Wagar (1900) 185 Ill. 195,
57 N. E. 26. The intent to defraud
must be found by the jury from the
facts, but the incident of the falsely
made instrument being uttered usually indicates such an intent: Fox
v. People (1880) 95 Ill. 71. These
latter two elements of forgery are,
as the court found, undoubtedly
present in the principal case. The
check, if genuine, imports an absolute obligation in the maker; the intent to defraud is found in the defendant's violation of the company's
rules in dealing under a false account and without margin deposit,
and in the improper procuring and
uttering of the check payable to Oppenheimer.
The case of People v. Pfeiffer
(1910) 243 I1l. 200, 90 N. E. 680
is instructive as to what the statute
contemplates as a "false writing."
There, a trustee falsely represented
to the makers of notes that the notes
had been lost. As a result, duplicates were issued which were sold
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by the trustee and the money reThe inquiry then is whether, in
ceived thereon converted.
The the principal case, the defendant's
trustee did not indorse or alter these taking of the assumed name was
notes and the court found the trans- with the intent to deceive as to his
action was not a forgery. The dis- identity and so was of the essence
tinction must be made between an of the fraud. His position was such
instrument which is fraudulently
that, had he opened the account in
signed (forgery) and a genuine in- his own name, upon discovery of a
strument which the maker is in- falsification in the company's books
duced to execute through the fraud with respect to that account, suspiand misrepresentation of another cion would have been immediately
(false pretences): ibid., 205. Ill. directly toward him. The assumpRev. Stat. (Smith Hurd 1929) ch. tion of a false name was the most
38, sec. 277 is substantially the com- expeditious method of avoiding demon-law definition of forgery: Peo- tection in the event that the shortple v. Adams (1921) 300 Ill. 20, 132 age should be found. The fact that
N. E. 765. And under the common- the opening of a false account was
law and in those states adopting the contrary to the company's rules, is
common-law statement, the instru- additional evidence of the defendment or signature alleged to be ant's deceptive intent. Forgery has
forged must purport to be the act been found where the party's sole
of another than the party signing: intent in indorsing under an asGoucher v. State (1925) 113 Neb. sumed name was to prevent the
352, 204 N. W. 967, note 41 A. L. R. owner from tracing his property:
229, 231; Commonwealth v. Costello Rex v. Taft (1777) 1 Leach, C. L.
(1876) 120 Mass. 358; Common-. 172. In the leading case of Oregon
wealth v. Foster (1873) 114 Mass. v. Wheeler (1890) 20 Ore. 192, 25
311; contra Luttrell v. State (1886)
Pac. 394, an imposter drove up a
85 Tenn. 232, 1 S. W. 886. In the team of horses and desired to make
absence of any restrictive statute, a chattel mortgage on them in reit is the common-law right of a turn for a loan. The real party,
person to change his name: Loser whose name the imposter has asv. Plainfield Savings Bank (1910)
sumed, was unknown to the maker
149 Ia. 672, 128 N. W. 1101. The of the loan, but the court, in finding
mere assumption of a name without forgery in the indorsement of the
intent to deceive as to the identity note, thought the name had been asof the signer is not forgery: Consumed for purposes of deception.
monwealth v. Costello, supra at 371.
Oregon v. Wheeler, supra, has
This distinction was pointed out by been criticized on the basis that the
Lord Mansfield in an early casepresence of the horses and not the
"if a person gave a note entirely as name of the owner was the motivathis own, his subscribing it by a fic- ing factor in leading to the loan:
titious name will not make it a forg- Brown "The Forgery of Fictitious
ery, the credit being given wholly Names" (1896) 30 Am. L. Rev. 500,
to himself, without any regard to 511. The author of this article
the name." But where the instru- prefers to determine the presence
ment gains a "superior credit" as or absence of forgery by the intenthat of another, then -forgery is tion of the defrauded party rather
committed: Rex v. Dunn (1765) 1 than the intention of the alleged
Leach, C. L. 57.
forger, though he cites no criminal
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cases resembling the principal case
where such a test has been applied.
On general principles, it would seem
manifestly unfair to the defendant
to measure his criminality by the
intent of another person. It is true
that, in determining civil liability
where a check is given to an impostor, the courts may find an intention of the drawer to give the
check to the impostor, thus protecting the drawee at the expense of
the drawer: Land Title & T. Co.
v. Northwestern Nat. Bank (1900)
196 Pa. 230, 46 Atl. 420; Robertson v. Colenmn (1886) 141 Mass.
231, 4 N. E. 619. But, perhaps illogically, the majority of such cases
refer to the indorsement by the impostor to whom the check was "intentionally" given as forgery: see
cases cited Note 22 A. L. R. (1923)
1228; Note 52 A. L. R. (1928) 1326.
In effect then, it has seemed to make
no difference with respect to the
criminal offense found to be present
whether the intention of the defrauded party or the forger be used
as a criterion and there can be no
objection to the court's following
precedent in the principal case in
finding the gist of the forgery to be
in the assumption and signing of a
false namo which purports to be
that of another.
JACK G. BOYLE.
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE BANISHMENT--PROBATION.--[Michigan] The defendant was convicted
of violating the Michigan liquor
law, a felony, and the court's sentence imposed a fine and declared
that the defendant "must leave the
State of Michigan within thirty
days and not return for the period
of probation" fixed at five years.
Held, on appeal, that the portion of
the sentence providing for banish-

ment from the State should be reversed since there was no statutory
authority for such a sentence and
the penalty of banishment would be
impliedly prohibited by public policy
as tending to incite dissension, provoke retaliation, and disturb the
fundamental equality of political
rights among the states: People v.
Baum (1930) 251 Mich. 187, 231
N. W. 95.
Cited in the opinion, and apparently the only other case of direct
banishment to be found, is State v.
Baker (1900) 58 S. C. 111, 36 S.
E. 501. In that'case the defendant
was sentenced to seven years imprisonment of which he was to serve
five years and, thereupon, be released upon condition that he should
serve the remaining two years if he
ever re-entered the state. In reversing the banishment terms of this
sentence, the appellate court said 'it
recognized no right in the trial
judge to sentence a criminal to perpetual banishment.
The practical equivalent of banishment has been accomplished by
means other than direct sentence.
In State v. Hatley et al. (1892) 110
N. C. 522, 14 S. E. 751, the trial
court after imposing sentence, declared the capias, by which the convicted persons were to be taken into
custody to serve their sentence,
would not issue if they left the
state within thirty days. Defendants departed from the state but
later returned and were imprisoned.
Upon the issue raised on writ of
certiorari, the court declared that
"the judgment . . . cannot be
fairly construed as a judgment of
banishment, if so, it would be void,"
and denied the writ. Cf. In re H-!inson (1911) 156 N. C. 250, 72 S. E.
310. Moreover, the same result as
banishment has been obtained in
cases of pardons granted and ac-
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cepted on condition that the crim- pines 146, 149. Such a state statinal depart from and remain outside ute, however, might be held to conthe state: State er rel. O'Connor flict with certain rights of citizenv. Wolfer (1893) 53 Minn. 135, 54
ship accruing under the Federal
N. W. 1065; Ex parte Hawkins Constitution. In conclusion, certain
(1895) 61 Ark. 321, 33 S. W. 106:
arguments to combat a banishment
State V. Barnes (1890) 32 S. C. 14, statute might be suggested, namely,
10 S. E. 611, 17 Am. St. Rep. 832. rights of Federal citizenship as disFor further annotations, see: (1892)
tinguished from State citizenship
14 L. R. A. 286, 287, 288; (1907)
inclide the right of free passage
7 Ann. Cas. 92, 93; (1884) 59 Am. throughout the Union, the right to
Dec. 576; (1907) 111 Am. St. Rep. travel in interstate commerce or use
111.
navigable waters.
If public policy is the ground for
D. V. LANSDEN.
objection to the sentence of banishment in the principal case, it would
PARDON - CONVICTION AS SECOND
seem to apply with equal efficacy to
cases of withholding a capias for
OFFENDER
WHEN
PARDONED
FOR
taking the sentenced criminal into FIRST OFFENSE.-[Louisiana]
Decustody and to cases of pardons fendant was granted an absolute
granted on condition that the crim- pardon after serving sentence for
inal remain outside the state. The the crime of embezzlement in Texas.
true reason for reversal appears to Subsequently in Louisiana he was
bo absence of statutory authority convicted of forgery and sentenced
for such a sentence. For decisions as a second offender, from which
declaring that a sentence of a dif- sentence defendant appealed. Held:
ferent character from that author- that the judgment be set aside and
ized by law is void if it exceed the the case remanded for sentence as
maximum permitted, see: Ex parte a first offender; that a full pardon
Clarke (Okla. Cr. Ct.. App. 1925)
restored the appellant to the status,
236 Pac. 66; State v. McMahon so far as the law is concerned,
(Iowa 1926) 211 N. W. 409; United which he occupied prior to convicStates v. Holtz (E. D. N. Y. 1923)
tion: State v. Lee (1931) 171 La.
288 Fed. 81, affirmed sub nomine
... , 132 So. 219.
Holtz v. United States (C. C. A.
Although a pardon does not have
2nd 1923) 293 Fed. 1019 (memothe retroactive effect of giving the
randum decision).
Based on this convict an action against the state,
ground the principal case seems to nevertheless it has been held to rebe correctly decided.
move the disabilities of conviction
A state statute authorizing ban- and restore civil rights: Commonishment apparently would not be wealth v. Quaranta (1928) 295 Pa.
particularly objectionable. A pos- 264, 154 A. 89 (witness) ; State v.
sible reason discountenancing ban- Lewis (1904) 111 La. 693, 35 So.
ishment, that such punishment 816 (voter); Puryear v. Commonwould be cruel and unusual, has been wealth (1887) 83 Va. 51, 1 S. E.
removed. See United States v. Ju
512 (juror). Contra: In re Spencer
(1878) 5 Sawy. 195 (pardoned conToy (1905) 198 U. S. 253, 269, 270;
Fong Yue Ting v. United States vict unable to secure naturaliza(1893) 149 U. S. 698. 708, 709; tion) ; State v. Carson (1872) 27
Legarda v. Valdez (1902) 1 Philip- Ark. 469 and State v. Parks (1909)
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122 Tenn. 230, 122 S. W. 977
(though pardoned, fact of conviction prevented judge from holding
office). A pardon does not entitle
one to recover fines paid: Byrum
v. Turner (1916) 171 N. C. 86, 87
S. E. 975. Contra: Cole v. State
(1907) 84 Ark. 473, 106 S. W. 673;
Holliday v. People (1848) 10 Ill.
214 (discharged from paying fine
but not costs). By legislative authority the governor may have
power to certify the restoraton of
cvil rights: People v. City of Chicago (1921) 222 111. A. 100. Contra:
Foreman v. Baldwin (1860) 24 II1.
298 (civil rights restored only by
petitioning legislature).
The pardoning power is an executive function and no legislative act
can limit the effect of an unconditional pardon which relieves the
offender from all resulting legal
consequences: Ex parte Garland
(1867) 4 Wall. 333, 32 How. Prac.
241; Easterwood v. State (1895) 34
Tex. Crim. 400, 31 S. W. 294; Osborne v. United States (1875) 91 U.
S. 474 (rights of property restored); Carlisle v. United States
(1872) 16 Wall. 147 (alien disloyalty); Fite v. State (1905) 114
Tenn. 646, 88 S. W. 941; Bishop,
"Criminal Law" (9th ed. 1923)
sec. 898. To this point most courts
agree, but there is a marked division
of opinion as to whether enhanced
punishment for a subsequent offense
is a legal consequence of a prior
pardoned conviction. To aid the
definitive powers a distinction has
been used as between legal consequences and civil rights: Scrivnor
v. State (Tex. Crim. 1928) 20 S.
W. (2) 416 (distinguishing the
status of the witness)* Comment
(1930) 3 S. Cal. L. R. 438. A pardon has been held, as in the principal case, not to be limited in effect
to a mere restoration of citizenship,
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to the right to testify and to the
rights of suffrage, but as a legal
consequence to prohibit in a subsequent trial plea and proof of the
conviction as a means of bringing
about a heavier penalty: State v.
Martin (1898) 59 Ohio St. 212, 52
N. E. 188, 43 L. R. A. 94; Edwards
v. Commonwealth (1883) 78 Va. 39
Ca remission of guilt-held erroneous by Williston, "Does a Pardon
Blot Out Guilt?" (1915) 28 Harv.
L. R. 647, 655); Scrivnor v. State,
supra. A convict under a suspended
sentence from a felony conviction
may not be committed to the penitentiary on the record of a subsequent pardoned conviction: Sanders
v. State (1928) 108 Tex. Crim. 467,
1 S. W. (2) 901, 57 A. L. R. 440;
Comment (1928) 41 Harv. L. R.
918. An Oklahoma court has gone
so far as to hold that in legal contemplation the offense itself is obliterated: Ex parte Collins (1925)
32 Okla. Crim. App. 6, 239 Pac.
693.
Another group' of decisions reason that any consideration of a
prior pardoned conviction in determining the penalty for a subsequent offense is not a legal consequence of the former offense since
the fact of conviction is used as an
indication of criminal depravity:
Mount v. Commonwealth (1865) 63
Ky. 93; State v. Edelstein (1927)
146 Wash. 221, 262 Pac. 622; People v. Kaiser (1929) 135 Misc. 67,
236 N. Y. S. 619; Carlesi v. New
York (1914) 233 U. S. 51; 34 Sup.
Ct. 576 (affirming 208 N. Y. 541,
101 N. E. 1114). A pardon is no
defense to disbarment proceedings
based on the pardoned offense:
Nelson v. Commonwealth (1908)
128 Ky. 779, 109 S. W. 337, 16 L.
R. A. (N. s.) 272; In re Egan
(1928) 52 S. D. 394, 218 N. W. 1.
Contra: Scott v. State (1894) 6
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Tex. Civ. App. 343, 25 S. W. -337.
That a pardon should be no defense
to a trial and sentence as a second
offender for a subsequent offense
finds support in analagous decisions.
The greater criminality attaching to
one who repeats an offense justifies
increased punishment for second offenders: People v. Craig (1909)
195 N. Y. 190, 88 N. E. 38. Legislative discretion may treat a former
conviction in another state as having the same effect as a domestic
conviction as applied to habitual
criminals: McDonald v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1901) 180
U. S. 311, 21 Sup. Ct. 389; Cross v.
State (1928) 96 Fla. 768, 119 So,
380. If a statute imposing increased
punishment is enacted between the
commission of the first and second
offenses, the later one may be punished as a second offense and the increased punishment is not regarded
as a part of the penal consequence
of the first offense but applies only
to the last as aggravated by repetition: Cross v. State, supra; Jones
v. State (1913) 9 Okla. Crim. 646,
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133 Pac. 249, 48 L. R. A. (N. s.)
204; "Cooley's Constitutional Limitations" (7th ed. 1903) 383. The
guilt of the accused would seem to
be affirmed by the pardon and in the
act of accepting the pardon the accused admits it: Burdick v. United
States (1915) 236 U. S. 79, 35 Sup.
Ct. 267; Manlove v. State (1899)
153 Ind. 80, 53 N. E. 385.
In the principal case the fact that
the defendant was pardoned after
serving his sentence may have been
a factor in the court's decision. The
nucleus of the problem is found in
the moralistic concept of 'guilt' and
it has been suggested that the power
of pardon be made expressly broad
enough to completely remove all
taint of guilt: Note (1913) 26
Harv. L. R. 644. Such a fiction
could hardly veil the actual reality
of guilt: Williston, "Does A Pardon Blot Out Guilt?" (1925) 28
Harv. L. R. 647. Society's protection against the habitual criminal
should never be diminished by the
use of the pardon.
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